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For many humanitarian agencies, acceptance—gaining the trust and protection of local communities—is the preferred
security management tool for reasons of perception, ease of access and cost (both real and opportunity costs).
Humanitarian agencies have long been uncomfortable with the contradiction of using deterrence mechanisms in
humanitarian operations, although the increased use of armed guards has been a noticeable trend over the last
decade or so. Protection—‘bunkerisation’—has also become the norm in many highly insecure contexts, with similar
contradictions and feelings of discomfort associated with this strategy. But in hyper-insecure contexts, is acceptance a
viable option? This paper argues that in some contexts, the acceptance strategy no longer works. The primary cause of
this is the increasing severity of the kidnapping risk which has overwhelmed the usefulness of ‘normal’, non-deterrence
and non-protection-oriented security measures such as acceptance. The dangers of relying on deterrence measures
for humanitarian organisations in such sensitive contexts will be reviewed. As a case study, the experience of one
particular humanitarian organisation working in northern Nigeria and Syria in the 2012–2014 period is elaborated
upon. A ‘zone of exception’ framework is proposed based on the work of Carl Schmitt. Issues for future reflection by
organisations working in such contexts are introduced.
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Humanitarian agencies have long had to concern them-
selves with managing insecurity. The myth of a golden
era when humanitarian agencies could work freely and
need not be concerned with their security is exactly that.
Though contested,1 over the last few years, a general
perception has formed that humanitarian contexts have
become increasingly dangerous for humanitarian agen-
cies. This paper focuses specifically on the growing
kidnapping risk. But first, it is important consider what
we know about the current state of aid worker security.
Data from the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD)
indicates that since 2009, kidnappings have become the
most frequent means of violence against aid workers of
all types—national NGOs, INGOs, the UN, ICRC/Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, internationals and
locals included. In 2009, it was estimated that 85% of
kidnapping cases did not end in death. There has also
been a year-on-year upward trend for major attacks of all
types (resulting in death or serious injury) (Stoddard et al.
2012, p. 2). A 2013 report also paints a disturbing picture
of the developing security situation for humanitarianCorrespondence: Cunninghamandrew2@gmail.com
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifworkers, stating that the number of major attacks rose
again in 2012 to 167 major incidents (Harmer et al., 2013,
p. 1) for the fourth time in a decade. That year,
kidnappings accounted for a quarter of all major attacks
on aid operations and 36% of aid worker victims (ibid, p.
3). In 2014, a subsequent report confirmed that 2013 was
‘another record-breaking year for violence against aid
workers’ with 460 victims (Stoddard et al. 2014, p. 2). Both
the number of attacks and number of victims were the
highest ever—a rise of 66% in number of victims and 48%
rise in number of separate attacks over the previous year
(ibid, p. 2). Kidnappings again were amongst the most
prevalent types of incident—out of 460 major incidents,
134 involved kidnapping (ibid, p. 4).
In 2013, 155 aid workers lost their lives, more than
double the previous year. By far, the largest number of
these (87%) were the national staff. The other 59 victims
(13%) were internationals, which though a far smaller
overall number illustrates a greater rate of attack when
compared to their numbers in the field (it is estimated
that less than 8% of humanitarian staff in the field are
internationals) (ibid, p. 3). Local NGOs and Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies have borne the greatest burden
of attacks. The top five contexts remain consistent, withis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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Syria appearing routinely.
In analysing the effects of insecurity on humanitarian
action, particularly the threat of kidnapping, this paper
takes a snapshot of the 2012–2014 period and builds a
case study around one humanitarian organisation’s
response to two insecure environments during that
period—northern Nigeria and Syria.2 Three key points
are highlighted:
 Although the number of major attacks fluctuates
year-by-year, the data up until the end of 2014
paints a grim picture of the contemporary security
context, indicating that providing humanitarian
assistance has indeed become increasingly more
dangerous. There are consequences to this besides
making security management more difficult. The
situation fundamentally affects the ability of
humanitarian organisations to implement their
activities, impacting on populations in danger
and their critical needs through their decreased
access to assistance.
 Kidnappings in particular are on the rise.
Kidnappings are not a new threat. They were
prevalent in the North Caucasus in the interwar
period in the 1990s and during the second
Chechnya war in the early 2000s. Columbia also saw
a high prevalence in the same era. The sense
currently though is that the kidnapping threat has
become generally more critical in a larger number of
contexts, which greatly concerns the aid community.
 The majority of attacks have occurred within a small
set of contexts, but this should not mask the fact
that serious attacks, including kidnappings, can
occur anywhere. Even one serious incident in a
context can have disastrous consequences—for the
individual, the organisation, the aid community and
especially, the populations needing assistance.
The Aid Worker Security Database on which the
paper draws is subject to several limitations. The first in-
volves the country’s specific nature of the data collection.
The data shows the number of attacks within countries
where aid workers operate but does not easily capture
regional dynamics. Threats which originate in a context
where aid workers are not present may impact where
and how aid agencies operate in neighbouring countries
to the point of forcing evacuations. In this case, due to
lack of presence, and therefore incidents, neither context
would appear to be dangerous. The second limitation is
that data collection only reflects attacks on aid workers
and not others. This would not be relevant except that
non-aid worker security incidents can negatively affect
neighbouring contexts where aid workers do work. Bothof these aspects are explored in more detail in the first
case study.
The paper first discusses the operational practises of
humanitarian agencies and the tools available to them in
managing and mitigating kidnapping risk, focusing on
the acceptance strategy. This is further explored through
analysing one humanitarian organisation’s response in
the two case study locations of northern Nigeria and
Syria. Finally, the paper proposes a framework for under-
standing the kidnapping phenomenon in relation to
humanitarian agencies.
Security management tools—promise and limits
The toolkit of security management approaches available
to humanitarian agencies include three basic strategie-
s—protection, deterrence, and acceptance. Protection re-
fers to hardening the target, which reduces vulnerability
but does not address the threat.3 It involves reducing
exposure, decreasing visibility, and utilising protective
devices and procedures, such as walls and barbed wire.
This strategy is common in many contexts, and its
extreme form is often referred to as bunkerisation.
Isolating an agency’s personnel and materials in com-
pounds with guards, defensive walls and limited access
has in fact long been a normal response in many areas
of insecurity.
Deterrence aims to actively counter threats and intimi-
date those behind them by use of armed protection, in-
junctions, withdrawal and/or suspension of activities.
One form of deterrence which has been widely debated
in recent years has been the use of armed protection. In
some contexts, such as Somalia, this has been the norm
for decades. Armed guards and escorts were also com-
mon in the North Caucasus for many years, and hu-
manitarian agencies have begun to use armed protection
in a larger number of contexts, such as in Iraq. One
argument against their use is based on the perceived in-
compatibility between the use of armed personnel and
the nature humanitarian action, with the threat of force
in the implementation of humanitarian operations seem-
ing contradictory to the ethos of humanitarian action,
which is based on the alleviation of suffering.
The third option is acceptance, which aims to increase
the consent for the agency to implement its operations.
Acceptance
An acceptance strategy tries to reduce or remove threats
by ‘increasing the acceptance (the political and social ‘con-
sent’) for an organisation’s presence and work in a particu-
lar context (politicians and the military call this ‘winning
hearts and minds’)’ (van Brabant 2000, p. 58). Acceptance
involves making and using contacts (networking), man-
aging one’s image and showing cultural respect. The na-
ture and appropriateness of programming also plays a key
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discussing the value of an agency’s presence with local
communities, are key tactics. The goal is to be more than
tolerated, but rather, to be accepted into the communities
where humanitarian operations are being implemented.
Acceptance is widely considered to be the preferable
strategy for reducing or removing threats. As a strategy,
it does not involve using weapons or the threat of force.
It also does not rely on bunkerisation, though some as-
pects of protection may be used even if the primary
strategy followed is acceptance, such as walled com-
pounds and the use of unarmed guards. Even agencies
which state that acceptance is at the heart of their secur-
ity management strategy will often harden their com-
pounds. For many, there is a difference between using
protective elements in the construction of compounds
and limiting uncontrolled access, and bunkerisation,
which entails the isolation of an agency from the com-
munity and is more difficult to reconcile with the con-
cept of acceptance.
Acceptance can therefore be paired with selected ele-
ments of other strategies, even the use of armed escorts
for travel between locations. But organisations will quite
often strive to put an acceptance strategy at the heart of
its security management policies. As a way to achieve
maximum proximity to the population—to know what
their needs are and to be able to provide well-targeted
services in a sensitive manner—it is considered the best
strategy. In fact, if it works properly, it is a self-
reinforcing process. The better the knowledge an organ-
isation has about a population and context, the better
the programming, which ensures improved acceptance
and security. In contrast, reliance on protection and es-
pecially deterrence will often create a negative feedback
loop which will decrease the effectiveness of an agency’s
operations. Recognising this, organisations almost always
try for at least basic consent form and contact with com-
munities; rarely is acceptance given up on entirely.
The promise of acceptance is great. Its theoretical util-
ity and minimal costs, including decreased opportunity
costs, makes it the gold standard.4 But there are also
limits to its promise and a variety of reasons why it may
not work. These mostly revolve around cases of extreme
insecurity or an incompatibility between an organisa-
tion’s background and mandate and a local community’s
worldview. There can also be tensions between agencies
and local power structures. Acceptance requires a work-
ing relationship based on respect, trust, and mutual
benefit. But building such a relationship, and in certain
circumstances, having any form of positive relationship
at all, is sometimes not feasible, given the political and
security environment.
A key weakness of the acceptance strategy, if less ac-
knowledged, is that even in situations where acceptancemay work at a local level, other influences can interfere
with the development of a constructive working relation-
ship between humanitarian agencies and local actors.
There is a common view that ‘all security is local’,
necessitating the contextualisation of security data
(Stoddard et al. 2012, p. 1). To a certain extent, this is
true, as acceptance is primarily a local interaction be-
tween international agencies and local actors within the
communities in which assistance is being provided. But
external developments—transnational threats—may also
adversely affect this localised acceptance. These include,
for instance, anti-Western sentiments based on religious
and political developments globally; the presence of
transnational terrorist/criminal organisations; or the use
of international agencies as ‘political footballs’ by na-
tional or regional actors. There are therefore contexts
where acceptance may not work because of forces
outside the control of both international agencies and
local actors.
Acceptance also has limits that relate to specific types
of security risks. Relying on acceptance to mitigate the
risks of humanitarian personnel being kidnapped is
highly challenging. In a situation where the chances of
kidnapping are significant, it would be a high-risk strat-
egy to rely solely on local acceptance for protection—
particularly since in some situations, it is not the local
actors who are the source of the threats. Given the ser-
ious implications of a kidnapping, lower risk strategies,
such as decreasing presence, are preferred.
Understanding and evaluating the usefulness of ac-
ceptance requires an element of measurement that is
not straightforward. One very simplistic method is to
gauge how freely aid workers can travel outside their
compounds without trepidation, thought to security
concerns, and pre-planning. This can range from com-
pletely free access and movement, to full bunkerisation
with little movement outside, or to the use of deterrence
in the form of armed protection. At a certain point, ac-
ceptance ceases being a viable strategy, and organisa-
tions must consider relying more fully on protection or
even deterrence (or not, as some organisations refuse to
do so on ethical grounds). Whilst it is possible to chart
the free movement of aid workers, this involves a high
degree of subjectivity, as prescriptions on aid workers’
movement are ordinarily determined by the judgement
of those responsible for security management within the
organisation. Numbers can help with giving an impres-
sion of what the threats are and what the level of risk is,
but a comprehensive understanding of a strategy such as
acceptance requires more than this. It requires in-depth,
qualitative analysis to access ground truths and under-
stand the ‘hearts and minds’ of people.
This qualitative analytical process is based on deep
context analysis, wide-spectrum networking, empathy
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tion of local knowledge and the understanding of
transnational threats and regional dynamics, which is es-
pecially vital in mitigating against the risk of kidnapping.
The tools to engage in such a process are available and
known but often ignored or underutilised, as such
process takes more time, skill and resources than the
performance of simple mathematical equations which
assign a number to a risk.
With this background discussion concerning accept-
ance in mind, the two case studies will be considered to
see how these issues play out in practise.
Case study 1: northern Nigeria
The northern Nigeria context has changed dramatically
over the last few years. Whilst the security challenges
are many and complex, the focus here is on the armed
non-state groups Boko Haram, Ansaru and AQIM.
Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Mohammed
Yusuf. The group is more properly called Jama’atu Ahl
asSunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad).
In 2003, it sought to establish an encampment on the
Niger border, called Afghanistan, but this was soon
destroyed by the security forces. For the next few years,
the group remained fairly passive, but 2009 marked a
transition for the group into a more active military role.
Yusuf was killed, and violence between the remaining
Boko Haram militants and the Nigeria state security ser-
vices became common, particularly in Bauchi, Borno,
Yobe and Kano states. Abubakar Shekau took over the
leadership in 2010, and the group has since been respon-
sible for thousands of civilians killed and a large number
of attacks on military targets (Simonelli et al. 2014, pp.
1-2). In essence, Boko Haram is a Sunni jihadist group
attempting to clear away what they consider to be the
corrupt power structure in place in northern Nigeria
and replace it with a regime following a fundamentalist
interpretation of Islam.
The armed group Ansaru split with Boko Haram in
January 2012, reportedly over disagreements about what
constituted legitimate targets. Ansaru claimed Boko
Haram was not acting correctly in killing innocent
Muslims. Similarly, Boko Haram did not like Ansaru’s
focus on kidnapping foreigners for ransom, as it wished
to focus on the Nigerian government and security forces
in the effort to rid the north of corrupt elite power
structures (Simonelli et al. 2014, p. 4). Ansaru was in-
volved in the kidnappings of a British and an Italian en-
gineer in the north-western state of Kebbi in May 2011,
which ended in the death of the hostages who had been
held in Sokoto. The captors detected the presence of a
foreign military surveillance team and followed standing
orders to kill the hostages if there were an attempt tofree them (Zenn 2013, p. 2). Hostage killing became a
recurring pattern. A German engineer was kidnapped in
Kano in January 2012 and died during a Nigerian-led
rescue mission (ibid, p. 3). In February 2013, seven more
foreigners were kidnapped from a construction site in
Bauchi, north-eastern Nigeria, and on 9 March 2013,
they were reportedly killed (Zenn 2013, p. 4).5 Common
wisdom within humanitarian organisations at the time
said that the kidnappers were under pressure by the se-
curity forces and were thus forced to kill the hostages.
Far from being solely an indigenous Nigerian ter-
rorist group, Ansaru has conducted its operations
with the support of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), which has tried to link with indigenous
sub-Saharan groups (Zenn 2013, p. 4). AQIM traces
its roots back to the Algerian civil war of the 1990s
and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The group
became affiliated with Al-Qaida in the early 2000s
and took on a more regional approach (Laub and
Masters 2014).
Cooperation developed between Nigerian groups
and AQIM in the kidnapping of two Frenchmen in
Niamey, Niger, in January 2011. This incident ended
with their death the day after their kidnapping in a
rescue attempt involving the French military (Zenn, p.
5). It has been widely reported, and has been an op-
erating assumption for agencies working in northern
Nigeria, that AQIM gives support to Ansaru with the
agreement that the group would take advantage of
the presence of foreigners in Nigeria by kidnapping
them and handing them over to AQIM operatives in
the Sahel for money, arms and training (ibid, p. 6). In
February 2013, Boko Haram appeared to have chan-
ged its tactics by kidnapping a seven-member French
family in northern Cameroon, followed later by other
kidnappings of priests and nuns in November 2013
and April 2014 (Cummings 2014).
During this period, AQIM’s intervention in local griev-
ances in northern Mali provoked France to intervene
militarily in the country in January 2013 (Annis 2013).
This was a relatively short intervention as France began
drawing down its forces in April and handed over
responsibility to a UN force in July–August 2013 (BBC
2014a). The key point here is that this foreign inter-
vention heightened anti-Western tensions in the re-
gion and provided greater impetus for the kidnapping
of Westerners. The AQIM statements were clear at
the start of the Mali intervention:
1. We send a clear warning to the government of the
aforesaid countries; France, Britain, Holland and
Sweden, that their stances a military attack (sic) on
the mujahideen in north Mali will be taken as their
approval for executing their citizens…
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hostages, their blood will be divided on everyone who
participated in this [inevitable] aggression, and the
European governments and their followers of
governments of the coastal region will bear the full
responsibility for what happens.
3. The Mujahideen do not wish for such a tragic ending,
and they are careful to find a peaceful and just
resolution for the affair of the hostages. And based on
it, we direct an urgent call to the families of these
hostages; we say to them: you must pressure your
governments to avoid…this military operation that
will surely cause the death of your relatives.
4. We demand from the media of the European
countries in question to shed the light on this risk
and political adventure the governments are going to
wage, careless toward the blood of their citizens
(Flash Point Partners 2012, p. 1).
The humanitarian organisation under consideration, in
its overall policy document for the mission, stated that it
was working in Nigeria in order to provide emergency
response in many locations of the north, as this area fea-
tured frequent outbreaks of disease. The organisation
was also positioned in the north in case of degradation
of the security and civil situation in northern Nigeria. In
the event of such violence, ‘it would be very difficult to
negotiate access to the north, especially as Western
organisations are likely to be perceived as siding with
the Christian south. It is therefore desirable to have a base
of acceptance, knowledge, and activities in the north should
the need to arise respond to a civil crisis’. An acceptance
policy was then at the heart of the access strategy.
Though much of Nigeria has faced serious security is-
sues over the years—especially in the Niger Delta, where
kidnapping has long been a serious issue for foreign
workers, the north had been relatively safe for aid
workers throughout the noughts. For the most part, an
acceptance strategy had successfully been used by the
organisation until the rise of the kidnapping threat.
Some protection tactics had always been used, such as
the use of unarmed guards and fences around com-
pounds, but focus had remained on an acceptance strat-
egy. The situation changed quickly and fundamentally
over a short period, however, beginning in 2012. Internal
security documents from 2012 detail a concern that
kidnappings could occur by criminal groups with the
intention to sell hostages to AQIM, but this was not yet
considered a high risk. But by 2013, the kidnapping risk
was considered to be so serious that one of the far
northern projects, located on the Niger border, was
closed due to the high potential for kidnappings. The
threat analysis was clearly stated in internal security
documentation from the time:The biggest threat that the mission faces is related to
the activities of national and transnational militant
groups and the subsequent threat of the kidnapping of
expatriates. The rise of the militant group Ansaru over
the last year has become one of the biggest security
threats to the mission. The intensity of their links with
AQIM can be debated, but what cannot be debated is
the fact that Ansaru has been involved with a number
of kidnappings of expatriates over the last year. …
The concern remains in place, and in fact has been
heightened, that criminal groups may kidnap expats
on speculation to be sold to AQIM. The composition
and extent of local/regional criminal groups is to a
large part still unknown and needs further research. A
continually improved security related network will
assist in finding out more about such groups (Security
Report, 2013).
The primary concern then was the activities of Ansaru,
their links with transnational groups, and the threat of
expatriate kidnappings. But how new was this threat for
the organisation and how serious was it really consid-
ered to be for the organisation at that point in time
(spring 2013)?
Kidnapping has always been a significant risk; there
are internal Nigerian groups that may wish to abduct
expats for ransom or for political reasons. However,
since the war began in Mali in late 2012, the risk of
abduction driven by external actors has shot up. As of
early 2012, it was rumoured that AQIM would pay
$200,000 for a European hostage. … Since the war in
Mali began, it seems clear that AQIM’s appetite for
foreign hostages is increasing. This means that not
only ideologically motivated persons may be motivated
to kidnap expats, anyone seeking money may see the
opportunity to abduct expats for sale to AQIM. In
particular, the ‘incursion-style’ abductions in early
2013 indicate the probability of highly-motivated ac-
tors with transnational connections (principally to the
north, into the Sahel) proactively seeking out Western
hostages (Nigeria Country Security Plan March 2013).
The ‘incursion-style’ abductions mentioned relate to a
tactic used in some incidents where massive force was
applied to overwhelm a target’s defences. The ‘direction’
of these incursions was from north to south, indicating a
northern, even cross-border, origin of the kidnappers.
The fear was based on real data as since between 2003
and 2012, 68 Westerners had been kidnapped in the
Sahara region, 50% between 2008–12. It was estimated
that $30 million had been paid in ransom since 2008.
The ‘going rate’ was considered to be $2 million per
expat (Kravitz et al. 2014). These figures do not exactly
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eral impression was shared—there had been many kid-
nappings in the wider region, foreigners were the focus,
each expatriate was valuable, and a large amount of ran-
som money had been collected by kidnapping groups.
Most of the people kidnapped were in fact not aid
workers. But who the hostages were was in many ways
irrelevant, outside possible financial considerations, as it
was only important that they were foreigners and prefer-
ably from a politically relevant country. If the objective
was ransom, what the expatriate was doing was less im-
portant than who the expatriate was.
The presence of transnational criminal/terrorist groups
operating in the region became a dominate theme for the
organisation. Security management in the project area
remained based on acceptance when considering local se-
curity issues, and this strategy had been quite successful in
managing the project’s security. But the introduction of
regional threats fundamentally changed the operational
context and opened an internal debate on whether accept-
ance was still sufficient. In the end, the decision was made
that emerging risks could not be managed through an ac-
ceptance strategy and that the at-risk project on the
border should be closed. Three key points informed the
organisation’s decision to close the project.6
The first involved the seriousness of the threat—
kidnapping. Based on the context and the analysis that
the organisation had made, it was determined that the
kidnapping risk was extremely serious. The conse-
quences of any kidnapping are frightening, but then,
recent history of kidnappings in northern Nigeria and
the region had shown how alarming the incidents had
become.
The second involved the organisation’s inability to
monitor the context properly with regard to trans-
national terrorist/criminal groups operating at the
regional level. This goes to the core of the issue—the
lack of space to build a relationship or even trust in the
possibility of contacting regional groups. In fact, the
organisation determined that there was no feasible way
to contact the groups that would potentially be involved
in a kidnapping, at least in any meaningful way. This
was partly due to the perceived incompatibility of the or-
ganisation’s objectives as an international humanitarian
agency and a transnational terrorist group. Except in a
case of a kidnapping for purely financial gain, it was also
thought unlikely that a group responsible for a kidnap-
ping would want to enter into negotiations with a
foreign agency which had no official mandate and little
formal political power, especially when the motive for
the kidnapping would most probably be political in
nature.
And the third point was the judgement that an aggres-
sive deterrence strategy would not provide an acceptablelevel of security, even if the organisation decided to use
one. In this situation and given the low level of emer-
gency needs exhibited in the project area, such a strategy
would both not be viable and not indicated.
Other factors were also considered besides these three
main points. Organisational reputation was a concern—
kidnappings can have a very negative effect on how an
organisation is viewed. In addition, there are long-term
effects of a kidnapping on the ability of agencies to
continue to work in a given context. But it was the
context-specific considerations discussed above that dir-
ectly informed decision-making.
The Nigeria case is one example of a situation where
emerging transnational/regional types of security threats
can very quickly overwhelm an organisation’s security
management options. Even if on a local level, acceptance
works as a strategy in the face of transnational threats,
especially as they relate to the risk of kidnapping; an or-
ganisation can be pushed very quickly from acceptance
to deterrence and can ultimately determine that no strat-
egies are viable. In this case, understanding the local
context was not sufficient; acceptance with the local
communities was not sufficient. It was the regional dy-
namics which made the organisation’s presence unten-
able. One of the important issues was the assumed lack
of ability to discuss and negotiate with the relevant ac-
tors. Tracking these regional issues was essential to
evaluating risk, but there were severe limitations on the
organisation’s ability to mitigate against these threats.
Case study 2: Syria7
A second example of how the kidnapping risk affects the
implementation of humanitarian operations concerns
beheadings by the Islamic State of Western hostages in
2014. There are two issues to discuss in the Syrian
context. The first involves the lack of local knowledge
that agencies had to deal with from the beginning and
which made acceptance less certain. In a sense, it is
debatable whether there has been any ‘local’ at all in the
Syrian context. And the second is that the context be-
came dominated by kidnappings with increasingly very
poor outcomes.
From August to September 2014, four Western expa-
triates were beheaded in Syria, nominally by the Islamic
State. This Sunni jihadist group traces its roots to the
Iraq conflict. The group Tawhid wa al-Jihad was estab-
lished in 2002 by the Jordanian Abu Musab al_Zarqawi.
But in 2004, a year after the US invasion of Iraq,
Zarqawi re-formed the group into al-Qaida in Iraq
(AQI) which was allied to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida.
Zarqawi was killed in 2006 but the group remained ac-
tive and in time created an affiliated organisation called
the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). After a period of being
weakened militarily by other Sunni groups, ISI was
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force in Iraq. By this time, the group had joined in the
insurgency against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria
under the name al-Nusra Front. In April 2013, the Iraqi
and Syrian groups merged to form the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Dissension caused some from
al-Nusra and al-Qaida to reject this formulation, but
those loyal to the leader al-Baghdadi maintained their
cohesion. At the end of 2013, ISIS moved back to Iraq,
taking over substantial territory. By June 2014, a
caliphate had been declared and the group became the
Islamic State. Islamic State’s involvement in Syria has
continued to grow. Many other groups, including al-
Qaida, have shunned the group and condemned its
brutality (BBC 2014b).
The Islamic State emerged as a brutal jihadist group
operating in the conflict zone where Western journalists
and aid workers were also attempting to operate. The
group’s willingness to use extreme violence was empha-
sised by the beheading of two journalists (both Ameri-
can) in August and September 2014 and then two aid
workers (both British) in September and October, with
two others (at the end of 2014) also threatened with
beheading (one American and one British). One of the
aid workers beheaded worked for the French INGO
ACTED and the second was an aid worker working pri-
vately with an aid convoy. ‘The motive changes accord-
ing to circumstances. Sometimes the unlucky captives
are insurance against attack or, worse, a target for retri-
bution’, and to explain the captures ‘their captives are
spies, they say, or prisoners of war, or bargaining chips
for the exchange of ‘hostages’ unjustly held in Western
prisons’ (Economist 2014, p. 40).
The year 2013 was the height of ISIS’s kidnapping—
several dozens were taken. After that time, there was
little expatriate presence in northern Syria. A common
view by aid agencies concerned about kidnappings was
that ISIS only started to ask for ransom when they were
put under military pressure and required funding. They
had already kidnapped locals for ransom but not yet
internationals. Once targeted, though, internationals had
‘netted multi-million euro ransoms from several
European governments’ (ibid). ‘Islamic State had been
very successful in raising funds through criminal activ-
ities and is a richly resourced group who made money
from natural resource extraction (oil), as well as kidnap-
ping for ransom. They are often referred to as the
world’s richest terrorist group’ (Lock 2014).
The Syria context could be interpreted as a local con-
text where extremely violent groups operate, or a local
context dominated by transnational oriented groups with
a larger agenda. Either way, acceptance was not a viable
strategy. As opposed to northern Nigeria where a
formerly ‘safe’ area had been threatened by transnationaljihadist groups, the Syria context was dominated by
groups which had both local and transnational charac-
teristics. The timing of the involvement of humanitarian
agencies had also been against the negotiation of safe ac-
cess. In the case of Syria, access before the insurgency
was for the most part blocked by the Syrian regime.
When cross-border access became possible in the midst
of the civil conflict, it was already too late to build a vi-
able acceptance strategy.
Whereas in Nigeria, an acceptance strategy had been
slowly built through developing a relationship over time
which was then disrupted, in Syria, relationships needed
to be built with a large set of different militant actors,
local and international, in the midst of active fighting.
Yet, it was not inevitable that the context would slide
into such brutality, where kidnappings were common
and had such negative outcomes. This was partly deter-
mined by how agencies dealt with such a context.
The underlying question is: Are any organisations
really equipped to work in such contexts? Large num-
bers of average Syrians, religious leaders, human rights
activists and diplomatic personnel have also been kid-
napped during the conflict (Giovanni 2014), demonstrat-
ing that even those with sufficient local knowledge and
contacts have been affected. Organisations must have a
good idea of the risk environment in any given context,
but in an extremely insecure context such as Syria in the
midst of a brutal civil war, it is even more imperative.
And with this knowledge comes a responsibility to make
informed decisions. As Ackerman (2014) states8: ‘It is ef-
fectively negligent to go into a place you don’t under-
stand and expose vulnerabilities. To think you’ll be left
alone because you are doing good is wrong…a kidnap-
ping can become a geo-political event’. In many of the
areas affected by the Syrian civil war, acceptance is
highly unlikely to be a viable strategy, and indeed, it is
difficult to see how protection or deterrence strategies
would work any better.
An informed decision may be to abandon the context
as the risk is too high and outcomes too poor, even given
the massive humanitarian needs are present. The organ-
isation under consideration in fact abandoned Islamic
State areas after suffering a kidnapping. Another option
may be to implement a remote management system, as
did the organisation under consideration once the levels
of insecurity for expatriates had become too high.9 The
remote management system put into place was an ex-
treme form—for the most part, no formal linkages
existed between the organisation and those implement-
ing aid programmes. Remote management operations
bring forward many ethical and operational dilemmas
related to risk transference, accountability, monitoring,
as well as challenges to the ability of organisations to
speak out about what they do not witness themselves.
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areas of northern Syria context have become off-limits,
at least in any traditional sense of humanitarian
programming.
Zones of exception?
Sovereignty can be defined according to prerogative:
‘The sovereign is he who decides on the state of
exception’ (Schmitt 1922/1934, p. 5). A state of ex-
ception, in essence, is a period of emergency where
normal rules do not apply. The rules still exist as a
reference point, but they are no longer applied given
the emergency situation which must be dealt with.
This idea of deciding on a ‘state of exception’—and
the related prerogative to make decisions based on
it—is at the core of the interaction between govern-
ments and humanitarian agencies. It can also apply to
the relationship between humanitarian agencies and
armed non-state actors.
A state of exception is a crisis point. In this paper, it is
correlated to both a context of civil conflict and a
context of transnational terrorism. As Schmitt stated,
‘what characterises an exception is principally unlimited
authority, which means the suspension of the entire
existing order. In such a situation, it is clear that the
state remains, whereas law recedes. Because the excep-
tion is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the
juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary
kind’ (Schmitt 1922/1934, p. 12). A state—often a failed
state—remains, whilst other actors attempt to institute a
new juristic order on the territory. This is precisely the
type of context in which humanitarian agencies often
attempt to operate. Without an adequate understanding
of this concept, humanitarian agencies will not truly
understand the security risks they face.
In the case of armed non-state actors, the question is
less about sovereignty per se, but rather an armed non-
state actor’s prerogative to decide on a state of exception
and, more importantly, what to do about it. In practise,
the concept of the state of exception should not be con-
fused with an actual declaration of a state of emergency,
as an armed non-state actor cannot declare one. But a
state of exception can be considered as any point in time
where a normal legal and administrative system—rules
and procedures—are fundamentally changed or ignored.
In this case, the legal and administrative order relates to
the local and international norms surrounding the work-
ing of humanitarian agencies. In a state of exception,
these rules are not followed. In most cases, a govern-
ment explains the changes on the basis of national se-
curity, a perceived threat to sovereignty and the like. An
armed non-state actor in such a situation is concerned
with achieving its objectives, in reference to other actors,
but outside their rule structure. In many cases, it is thevery rejection of the enemy’s norms and rules that is the
objective.
The essential element to be understood by aid agencies
is that the rules have changed and that the government,
or increasingly a non-state armed actor, has entered into
a new way of conceptualising the boundaries of its ac-
tion and the acceptability of action by external actors.
One critical way in which rules change or are ignored is
in relation to the International Humanitarian Law, and
the legal norms relating to respect for humanitarian
personnel. There has been a long-standing assumption
that these rules should always apply (even if this has
never really been the case in practise). But in many
contexts, these rules clearly no longer apply. It could be
argued that these places are ‘zones of exception’. This is
even the case for non-state armed actors. In the midst of
conflict, such actors, in the same way as states, make a
determination who is friend and who is enemy and
based on this determination decide on when to declare
that the rules concerning the proper treatment of en-
emies need to be discounted.
Within such an environment, there is a constant battle
between humanitarian agencies and armed non-state ac-
tors, as there is with governments, on the parameters—
moral, legal, and political—of their relationship.
Humanitarian agencies must ask: What is the limit of an
armed non-state actor’s prerogative? What laws and
legal codes apply to the humanitarian agencies and in re-
lation to the context? Is a ‘state of exception’ in place
and how does this inform their relationship with the
armed non-state actors and the population? Once a de-
cision is made that a context becomes a zone of excep-
tion, certain actors within this zone are considered
enemies and will be treated outside accepted norms. In
such a situation, acceptance is no longer a viable security
management strategy. Then, the discussion needs to be
had whether protection and deterrence will be able to
sufficiently mitigate the risk. Unfortunately, there are
few, if any, steps to take to improve security in such situ-
ations, at least in the most egregious cases. The worst-
case scenario is the abandonment of such contexts.
Are there any solutions, or is the situation hopeless in
such contexts? Some within the humanitarian commu-
nity think that ‘de-Westernising’ Western humanitarian
aid agencies may work. The idea is to somehow strip
away the Western identity of aid agencies, such as
through altered recruitment policies—favouring non-
Western employees, or by shifting the geographical
locations of their management centres to non-Western
settings. These strategies to change an organisation’s
identity are often referred to as ‘diversification and inter-
nationalisation’. Such a strategy may possibly work over
the long term and would bring with it many other bene-
fits beyond decreasing security risks, such as improved
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unlikely to have much effect. In particularly insecure
contexts, there has been a trend to use national staff or
expatriate co-religionists for the field level operations.
But these staff are still representing a foreign organisa-
tion and therefore remain at risk. In addition, deflecting
risk on to national staff is morally questionable. A search
for other methods to re-build a set of operational norms
for such zones of exception must be launched.
Conclusions
In summary, acceptance is not a viable strategy in all cir-
cumstances and for all security threats—and in fact it
never has been. The question is whether acceptance as a
security management strategy has lost ground in an
increasingly number of contexts and in relation to such
security threats as kidnapping. The concern is that in
particular circumstances, such as in northern Nigeria,
threats—especially the threat of kidnapping—come from
transnational groups operating regionally, and therefore,
the threat theatre has been delocalised. This delocalisa-
tion creates a potentially untenable situation for
humanitarian agencies, as their security management
options have become severely limited. And in the
Syria for example, it is debatable whether there is
even a ‘local’ to speak of, as the transnational aspects
of the context are so dominant. Acceptance as a
strategy was probably doomed from the start. And in
both cases, there has been a disturbing trend for kid-
napping victims to be killed.
This paper uses the concept of ‘zones of exception’ to
describe the case study situations. These are areas of
extreme violence where normal rules by which humani-
tarian organisations and states work no longer apply.
Such a view allows an organisation to label a context,
but more importantly it is a way for organisations to
analyse and respond to such contexts of extreme risk. It
is critical that humanitarian organisations have at their
disposal methods to both conceptualise the contexts
within which they work and upon which to base con-
crete responses. The fear is that this trend will continue
and affect a greater number of contexts and regions of
the world. There are no short-term fixes for this situ-
ation. More thought needs to be put into how the
humanitarian enterprise can re-shape itself to take into
account these disturbing trends.
Endnotes
1See for example: Neuman M. and F. Weissman (eds.).
2In the case studies, the organisation requested to remain
anonymous and is therefore not mentioned by name.
3From a technical standpoint, the terms threat and risk
have specific meanings. Threat refers to the potential
event or incident that may result in harm or injury tostaff, loss or damage of property, or negative impacts on
programmes or reputation. Risk refers to the likelihood
(probability of event occurring) plus the likely impact of
the threat (without mitigation and contingency mea-
sures). This paper, though, follows a more common,
looser usage of the terms.
4See Fast et al. Acceptance is not only a security
tool—it can apply to development programming also
and is sometimes not even used as such in humanitarian
operations.
5Although, there was only documented evidence of
four bodies.
6Much of this section is based on personal interviews
with officials from the organisation.
7This is a case study of the situation in 2014.
8As stated by Steve McCann, CEO of Safer Edge.
9See Howe et al. for a discussion about partnerships
between international and local organisations engaging
in humanitarian action in remote management and inse-
cure settings, particularly the northern Syrian case.
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